



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

the majority may be represented—say—by their three first preferences; the minority by their three last, or not at all.

The chapter on the Study of History as a means of educating public opinion is interesting and true. But History by itself can never be sufficient to qualify the democracy to solve political problems. To trust to it alone would be like teaching chemistry out of a text book and without demonstrations. We must have our political laboratories as well as class-rooms, and these are to be found wherever the people are gathered together for the purposes of common action.

HELEN BOSANQUET.

OXSHOTT, SURREY, ENGLAND.

THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS OF CHRISTIANITY. By John Caird, D. D., LL. D., late Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Glasgow, with a memoir by Edward Caird, D. C. L., LL. D., Master of Balliol. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons. 2 vols.; pp. cxli., 232; 297.

These volumes contain the Gifford Lectures delivered by Principal Caird at Glasgow in sessions 1892-93 and 1895-96. They are printed as they were delivered, without having had the author's revision before publication; but they are not on that account imperfect, except that, if Principal Caird's health had not given way, he might have written two or three additional lectures. The Master of Balliol's brief memoir of his brother is excellently done. Possibly some very fervent admirers of Principal Caird may think that the memoir is too modest, that Mr. Caird has carried his fraternal restraint too far; but if that be a fault, it is a good one. A man's fame stands with the impression which is made by his work, and it may well be questioned whether laudation in a biography has ever much value. The memoir gives us the picture of a strong, quiet nature, growing steadily in thought and power, without crisis or turmoil. The life of Principal Caird was that of a great preacher, teacher and administrator, outwardly uneventful, but ever more and more extensive and deep in its influence. No man in recent times did more to give breadth and sympathy to religious thought in Scotland. As his own spiritual and intellectual development proceeded without any violent breach or turning, and as in doing a revolutionary work he retained a conservative spirit, he was saved from the exaggerations in thought and expression which almost inevitably arise

from sharp conflict, and his teaching was broadly constructive and eminently wise. Thorough idealist as he was in his maturity, he was not in his student days laid hold of by philosophy, "at least in any form that strongly influenced his inner life" (p. lxxv.). But seeking an idealist basis for theology "as a form of scientific knowledge and not merely as a supernatural revelation," he passed from the study of Kant to an interest in Hegel, determined "mainly by two things: first, by the thoroughness with which he carries out the idealistic principle, and secondly, by the strong grasp of ethical and religious experience, which is, perhaps, Hegel's greatest characteristic" (p. lxxiv.). "As he would have nothing to do with sceptical defences of religion, so he spoke almost with contempt of the various half-way houses that have been built between the position of Kant and a thoroughgoing Idealism, as also of the many attempts of modern theologians to evade the open field of thought and to fall back upon some moral or æsthetic or religious faith, which is not to be explained or criticised by reason."

The first fruit of Principal Caird's endeavor to apply idealistic principles to theology was his well-known "Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion," and in these Gifford Lectures, his latest writings, the same line of thought is carried out. "What Green said of the 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion,' is true also of them. The line of argument followed is not in the highest sense original; it is in the main Hegelian, though not by any means following Hegel slavishly; the thought has been thoroughly assimilated and recast in the writer's mind, and is developed with the same lucidity and beauty of expression and fullness of illustration which are characteristic of his other writings" (p. cxxx.). According to the deed of foundation the subject of the Gifford Lectures is natural theology, and to some readers it may appear strange that the "Fundamental Ideas of Christianity" should be regarded as falling within the scope of the lectureship. We are accustomed to think of Christianity as essentially a revealed religion; but Principal Caird maintains from the outset that there is no fundamental distinction between natural and revealed religion, and, indeed, that the evidence and value of revealed religion lie in its higher rationality. "There is no such thing as a natural religion or religion of reason, distinct from revealed religion" (I., 23). "If we were to compare the teaching of revelation with that of the so-called natural religion in point

of accordance with reason and conscience, I unhesitatingly affirm that the former is more profoundly rational, more deeply true to our spiritual intelligence than the latter" (I., 19.). Christian religion and morality do not consist of natural religion and morality with some peculiar doctrines and virtues added: "Christianity is natural religion elevated and transmuted into revealed" (I., 24.). This main principle, laid down by Principal Caird in Lecture I., is further elaborated from another point of view in Lecture II., which deals with the relations of "faith and reason." The position of those who maintain the necessity of an initial and intuitive act of faith in all genuine religious experience, a response not of the head, but of the heart to the spirit of God, is expounded with a fairness and clearness so admirable as to be almost persuasive; but, while it is admitted that we must begin with faith, it is shown that the faith with which we begin is in reality implicit reason.

From this standpoint the remaining lectures consider in detail the fundamental ideas of Christianity, its view of God and His relation to the world, its theory of the origin and nature of evil, its system of moral restoration, through the ideas of the Incarnation and the Atonement, and its account of the kingdom of the spirit and the future life. The Trinitarian idea of God is defended on the grounds that "the highest unity is that which combines in itself the elements of unity and difference" (I., 62), and that "regarded as a mere solitary, self-identical infinite, the nature of God would be a stranger to that which is the highest element of a spiritual nature—the element of Love. Without life in the life of others, a spiritual being would not be truly spiritual" (I., 70.). A "solitary, self-sufficient God," having merely the capacity of love and other spiritual qualities, "would be only a potential God" (I., 72.). But nature and man, the finite world, cannot be regarded as the adequate medium of the self-revelation of God, (1) because the finite cannot fully express the infinite, and, (2) because "if the finite world were the only medium of the divine self-revelation, it would follow that the nature of God is a progressive one" (I., 75.). "All that unfolds itself progressively in the history of the world" must be regarded as "already comprehended in the eternal self-revelation of God." The further development of this idea involves a full consideration of the relation of God to the world (Lectures IV. to VII.). The Pantheist view is expounded so as to show that it exaggerates the unity

between God and the world, while on the other hand, the Deist view is shown to involve too sharp a dualism. Pantheism annuls the finite world or absorbs it in the infinite, Deism reduces God to a finite, anthropomorphic personality. But these systems are steps towards the Christian idea, the main elements in which are (1) that infinite Mind or Intelligence constitutes the reality of the world, not simply as its external creator, but as its inward spirit; (2) that by its very nature infinite Mind or Spirit has in it a necessity of self-manifestation to and in a world of finite beings, and (3) that the infinitude of God does not involve the negation of the finite world, but is the principle of the individuality and independence of nature and man (I., 143, 144). The discussion of Pantheism and Deism is clear, suggestive and far from unsympathetic, and the exposition of the Christian view, with its thorough and patient consideration of difficulties, is one of the finest parts of Principal Caird's work. Yet one cannot feel that the difficulties have been quite overcome, and the discussion itself suggests new questions in a way which is doubtless inevitable when we are considering such ultimate problems. If God and man are (as Principal Caird suggests; I., 157 *sqq.*) members of a relation, in such a way that each necessarily implies the other, does not God become finite? Must we not suppose some greater being, comprehending the relation and both of its members? It is, of course, true that we speak of a relation between whole and part, although the whole includes the part. But in such a case must not both whole and part be taken as abstractions? And, *ex hypothesi*, God is the concrete. There is, there must be, a way out of the difficulty; but the way remains to be found.

It is fundamentally the same problem that presents itself in the discussion of the origin and nature of evil, which is the other chief subject of these Gifford Lectures. The eighth Lecture considers, with admirable lucidity, balance and insight, the Augustinian or ecclesiastical theory, the merits and defects of which and of its Pelagian opposite are clearly represented, so as to form an introduction to the more comprehensive discussion in Vol. II. The various theories of the origin of evil are in this volume traced to Pantheist, Deist and Christian views of the relation of God to the world. The theories with a Pantheist basis are those which "virtually evaporate" the existence of evil by making it merely negative or privative and those which trace evil to "the sensuous nature of man," or to the "conflict which necessarily arises be-

Vol. XI.—No. 1

tween the flesh and the spirit." The theories which spring from Deist views are those which ascribe the origin of evil to an abstract human freedom, a freedom of indifference or something akin to it; while the Christian doctrine of sin follows from "the fundamental principle of Christianity," "that the finite spirit is the necessary organ of the being and life of God, and that this self-revelation" [of God in and to the finite world] "implies in the finite spirit an element of distinction or difference, which contains in it at least the possibility of sin" (II., 4). This account of the Christian doctrine of sin at once suggests, in another form, the difficulty already raised as to the relation of God to man. If God is the absolute Reality and if the finite is not illusory, must not the finite spirit, with all its acts and thoughts, be a moment in the life of God? Must not the "element of distinction or difference, which contains in it at least the possibility of sin" be a distinction or difference within the divine unity? And if this is so, it would seem best to take this as the foundation or starting-point of the inquiry and to endeavor to define sin in consistency with the principle that it must somehow be comprehended within the Absolute. This method is the strength of the "Pantheist" position, whatever value we may ascribe to the actual definitions it offers. The opposite method, which is the more generally followed, begs the question in its anxiety not to ascribe the causality of evil to God. It uncritically assumes as its governing principle a more or less definite theory of the nature of sin, which is the very object of the whole inquiry. It would be untrue to say that Principal Caird's argument rests on such dogmatic presuppositions. It is, indeed, remarkably little open to such a charge. And yet one cannot but feel that the definitions or descriptions of moral evil which he offers are not quite definite enough, that the question of the ultimate meaning of sin (its meaning in the absolute) remains somewhat in haze. "Goodness is true, badness false or perverted, self-realization." "For a being made in the image of God, sin is selfishness, goodness self-realization through absolute self-surrender to God" (II., 57). "It is not in the satisfaction of natural desires, but in the fact that it is an infinite nature that is seeking satisfaction in them, that the essence of sin lies" (II., 68). Accepting such statements as these, we still seek to know how, in a perfectly rational universe, "selfishness" or "perverted self-realization" is possible and what meaning we must attach to the words. And again one is tempted

to ask whether there is not a sense in which an infinite nature not only may, but must, seek satisfaction in natural desires, and whether sin or selfishness is not rather to be regarded as seeing things in wrong proportions and acting accordingly? Turning the question round, we might ask: Can there be a human "life spent in the satisfaction of merely natural propensities"?

The remaining lectures deal with doctrines (the Incarnation, Atonement, etc.), which belong more to theology proper than to Metaphysics or Ethics; but it is hardly necessary to say that the strong ethical interest of the book is maintained throughout and that the subjects are discussed with the calm, massive reasonableness and high spiritual feeling which we find in all Principal Caird's work. Considering the book as a whole, I think it may safely be said that nothing wiser, more fair and more sympathetic has been written regarding the "fundamental ideas of Christianity."

R. LATTA.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND.

TRAINING OF THE YOUNG IN THE LAWS OF SEX. By Rev. the Hon. E. Lyttelton. Longmans, Green & Co., 1900. Pp. ix., 117.

This little book is an earnest, honest, attempt to answer two questions: (1) "Since our children are exposed to the risk of gathering vicious ideas about life and birth, ought we not ourselves to forestall the danger by giving wholesome teaching?" and, (2) "If so, how is this to be done?" To the first of these questions the first, and larger, half of the book is devoted; the second question occupying the remainder. The writer tries to show that curiosity in regard to the mystery of birth and life, is natural, unavoidable, and, to begin with, innocent; that owing, not to supposed evil influences at school, but to neglect to satisfy this real need at home, such curiosity is at the mercy of evil-minded companions; that consequently from the beginning, a "subject which in itself is full of nobleness, purity and health," becomes indelibly associated with dissimulation, impurity and vice, to the direct injury of the innocent mind and to the destruction of that natural confidence between child and parent which, until these questions obtruded themselves, had been perfect; that the only effectual antidote to these evils is "healthy ideas previously implanted and based upon instincts of reverence and home affection"; and finally that "the resulting mischief (from neglect